Übersetzung und Analyse von Wörtern durch künstliche Intelligenz ChatGPT
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is it necessary to put down a deposit - Übersetzung nach griechisch
![[[Thomas Nagel]] argues that while a human might be able to imagine what it is like to be a [[bat]] by taking "the bat's point of view", it would still be impossible "to know what it is like for a bat to be a bat." (''[[Townsend's big-eared bat]] pictured'').](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Special:FilePath/Big-eared-townsend-fledermaus.jpg?width=200 "[[Thomas Nagel]] argues that while a human might be able to imagine what it is like to be a [[bat]] by taking \"the bat's point of view\", it would still be impossible \"to know what it is like for a bat to be a bat.\" (''[[Townsend's big-eared bat]] pictured'').")
![[[Daniel Dennett]] (''pictured'') has been a vocal critic of the paper's assertions](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Special:FilePath/Daniel dennett Oct2008.JPG?width=200 "[[Daniel Dennett]] (''pictured'') has been a vocal critic of the paper's assertions")
Wikipedia
"What Is It Like to Be a Bat?" is a paper by American philosopher Thomas Nagel, first published in The Philosophical Review in October 1974, and later in Nagel's Mortal Questions (1979). The paper presents several difficulties posed by consciousness, including the possible insolubility of the mind–body problem owing to "facts beyond the reach of human concepts", the limits of objectivity and reductionism, the "phenomenological features" of subjective experience, the limits of human imagination, and what it means to be a particular, conscious thing.
Nagel famously asserts that "an organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something that it is like to be that organism—something it is like for the organism." This assertion has achieved special status in consciousness studies as "the standard 'what it's like' locution." Daniel Dennett, while sharply disagreeing on some points, acknowledged Nagel's paper as "the most widely cited and influential thought experiment about consciousness.": 441
